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Abstract
We study non-organized boycott activities. We develop a boycott model where 
multiple consumers on the demand side fight against a misbehaved monopolist on 
the supply side. The goal of the boycott is to force the firm that lacks corporate 
social responsibility to change its behavior, for example, abandon polluting produc-
tion technology towards environmentally friendly actions. We analyze consumers’ 
and firm’s incentives and equilibrium strategies. Our paper describes the difficulty 
of winning a non-organized boycott in reality. We find that consumers’ free riding 
incentives limit the real boycott power even when the benefits to free ride is small. 
The larger the market the firm serves, the more likely an individual consumer would 
stop boycotting (who acts as a strict environmentalist), which leaves fewer boycott-
ers remaining in the costly conflict (who act as loyal supporters of the product). On 
the other hand, we show that the market size does not significantly affect the firm’s 
strategies. For a big firm, the consumer boycott will surely be effective, that is, lead 
to non-zero boycotter participation, but hardly successful, that is, not lead to the 
firm’s cessation of misbehavior.
Keywords War of attrition · Free riding incentives · Mixed strategy nash 
equilibrium · Non-cooperative game · Consumer boycott
JEL Classification C7 · D42 · D7
1 Introduction
A firm lacking the awareness of corporate social responsibility and deviating from 
a general accepted level of social norm may be boycotted by consumers (Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2004). Boycott can be launched and influenced by non-governmental 
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organizations (NGOs) or more commonly, non-organized voluntary consumer 
activism.1
Sometimes the boycotting group wins: the targeted firms are ‘forced’ to behave in 
a way that benefits the interest of boycotters. However, surprisingly, most of the time 
boycotts fail. This is so even when the number of the participating boycotters is ini-
tially large. There are some clear difficulties for the success of boycotts. First, a pure 
profit-driven firm may act without much concern of social norms. Being ‘patient’ 
enough, a firm can simply ignore boycotters’ behavior and the potential damage of 
corporate image and reputation as long as its financial loss remains at an accept-
able level. Second, free riding problem exists. Since the success of boycott generally 
does not require the contribution of all consumers in the market, each self-interested 
individual thus, more or less, has incentives to free ride on the collective actions of 
other boycotters. Third, the non-consistency of boycotters’ behavior limits the finan-
cial and reputational damage to the misbehaved firm. In most of the cases, only very 
few consumers stop purchasing from the non-ethical firm ‘permanently’ (before 
boycott success is achieved). Many boycotters may not continuously fight against 
the firm for a long period of time which limits the real boycotting power. Consum-
ers may act like ‘forgiving’ the unethical firm which is in fact driven by selfishness 
and free ride incentives. Fourth, there are the non-commitment and non-binding 
features. Boycotting as a consumer’s independent choice is not under any binding 
obligations. It implies the great difficulty, in fact almost impossibility, of boycotting 
coordination. Fifth, threatening to boycott has limited boycott power. Even if the 
boycotting is organized by some NGOs, it is more of a ‘threat to boycott’ rather than 
‘physical boycotting activity’. The firm may view consumers’ threats as cheap talk. 
Last but not least, the ongoing boycott may turn out to be harmless. The consist-
ency of few consumers’ boycotting behavior does not necessarily achieve any good 
outcomes. An unethical firm can ignore this group—if indeed there is sufficient boy-
cotting power that leads to a huge profit loss, the firm would have already changed 
its behavior in the first place. The firm only becomes more ‘patient’ and ‘persistent’ 
to fight against the ongoing boycotters over time with the hope of obtaining their 
potential ‘forgiveness’.
In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game between a profit driven firm 
that lacks of social responsibility and a number of potential boycotters who have 
environmental concerns. We try to address the following questions: on the demand 
side, which incentive dominates the consumer’s behavior, moral concern (to boycott 
1 There are many underlying causes of boycott activity, for example, inappropriate promotion of infant 
formula in developing countries (Nestlé), war (limit trade with Russia due to Ukraine), political reasons 
(US boycott of French wine 2003), protecting a river delta (Shell Oil), Soviet violations of human rights 
and invasion of Afghanistan (1980 Summer Olympics), abuse of monopoly power (Microsoft), unfair 
wages (Delano grape), production of genetically modified organisms (Monsanto), child labor (Nike and 
Lush’s supply chain in Jharkand, India), animal rights (KFC), product featured with criticism slogan 
(Abercrombie & Fitch in USA), destroying agricultural farms, greenhouses, ancient olive groves (Cat-
erpillar’s D-9 bulldozers in Palestine), conserving energy and reducing carbon emissions (the Close the 
Door campaign in UK), continuing rise of food prices (Cottage cheese in Israel), climate change denial 
and lack of investment in renewable energy (Esso/ExxonMobil), deepwater horizon oil spill (BP) and 
more recently, location of factory (Oreo) and independence (SodaStream), just list a few.
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and do the right thing) or selfishness (not to boycott and care about the subjective 
utility maximizing)? Why some consumers act like strict environmentalists (are 
willing to boycott with fighting costs for a long time) while others act like loyal sup-
porters of the product (never participate in boycotts or boycott for a short period)? 
And on the supply side, whether the size of firm, i.e., the number of potential boy-
cotters that the firm serves, matters, and if so, to what extent?
Our model extends Maynard Smith (1974)’s classic two-contestant game of war 
of attrition. We introduce free riding incentives and alliance advantages to players 
on the demand side. Consumers form a weak alliance to fight against a misbehaved 
monopolist. Taking side to the boycotters/alliance is cost-free but potentially ben-
eficial. No commitment to fully cooperate is required. Meanwhile, a prize may be 
awarded to a free riding consumer even without providing a personal contribution. 
We allow a prize to a successful free rider if the game eventually ends with his ally’s 
success. Each consumer wishes to obtain a prize with less effort.
We start from a two-against-one game. By comparing the mixed strategy equilib-
rium in our model to that of a classic two-contestant game, we examine the effect of 
the third player’s intervention. We discuss how consumers behave in the presence of 
potential support from the alliance and how the firm deals with it. We then let the 
number of players on the demand side increase to infinitely large. We find a unique 
mixed strategy equilibrium in the n-against-one game. We derive optimal strategies 
of both sides at the limit.
Our results explain the difficulty of winning a non-organized boycott in reality. 
On the demand side, we find that the consumers’ free riding incentives dominate 
their behaviors and therefore limit the real boycott power. The larger the market the 
firm serves, the more likely an individual consumer would surrender, which leaves 
fewer boycotters remaining in the costly conflict. We therefore explain the reason 
why some consumers act like loyal supporters of the product while others act like 
strict environmentalists. On the supply side, we show the market size does not signif-
icantly affect firm’s strategies. A polluting firm would change its misbehavior with 
slightly higher probabilities in a large economy. For a big monopolist that serves 
infinitely many consumers, boycott will surely be effective, that is, non-zero par-
ticipation, but hardly successful, that is, lead to the firm’s cessation of misbehavior.2
Wars of attrition have been studied both theoretically and empirically by many 
economists and social scientists after (Maynard Smith 1974). However, only limited 
attention has been paid on the influence of a third contestant’s contribution in a war 
of attrition framework taking account of alliance advantage and incentive to free 
ride. The closest studies to ours are Haigh and Cannings (1989), Bulow and Klem-
perer (1999) and Helgesson and Wennberg (2015) which discuss n-player competing 
for one or several prizes. Powell (2017) discusses the third party effects on a two-
player game by allowing a third party to take sides and provide endogenous inter-
vention to one of the two actors. He studies the case where a third party chooses a 
time to support one side after a conflict starts. Therefore at the time of joining the 
2 In Craig Smith (1990) paper, a boycott is ‘effective’ if there is non-zero participation and ‘successful’ 
if it leads to the cessation of the egregious act.
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game, the third party already forms a belief on the existing players’ ability/strength 
ordering, the potential winning party and the expected length of the conflict. In this 
paper, we analyze a game within a game where the boycotters play a prisoners’ 
dilemma against each other and meanwhile they form a weak alliance and play a war 
of attrition against the polluting firm.
Our research may also be linked with the literature on evolutionary games (see, 
e.g. Maynard Smith and Price 1973; Laruelle et  al. 2018). Several papers studied 
boycotts, cooperation, punishment and environmental compliance (da Silva Rocha 
and Salomão 2019) or more general punishment and cooperation games (da 
Silva Rocha et al. 2015; da Silva Rocha 2017) using an evolutionary game setting. 
In these papers, rational behavior is partially relaxed and the dynamic nature of the 
evolutionary game is analyzed. In our paper, we employ a repeat game and assume 
players to be fully rational. Our model can be potentially extended to a two-popula-
tion game where consumers’ types and preferences change based on the interaction 
with other boycotters.
Several articles study consumer boycott in different settings. Friedman (1991) 
and Delacote (2008) provide conceptual discussion on boycott actions. Tyran and 
Engelmann (2005) provide an experiment on boycott in reaction to a sudden cost 
increase in retail markets. They find that the cost increases the incidence of boycotts. 
Boycotts reduce market efficiency. Innes (2006) develops a model where two non-
identical duopolists face a threat to boycott from an environmental organization. He 
finds that at equilibrium a small persistent boycott would fight against the small firm 
and a large transitory boycott would fight against the large firm. It implies larger 
firms are easier to be defeated. Baron (2001) employs a game between an influential 
activist and a monopolist that has concerns for profit maximization, altruism and 
activist’s powerful threats. From a psychological perspective, John and Klein (2003) 
explain consumers’ boycotting incentives and willingness to sacrifice. Heijnen and 
van  der Made (2012) find that in a market under asymmetric information where 
consumers can signal high moral values, consumers always boycott with positive 
probability despite free-riding incentives and eventually results in a firm’s behavior 
alternation. In a war of attrition framework, Peck (2017) analyzes a game between 
a monopolist that produces two-period durable goods and consumers that demand a 
lower price. He derives both non-boycott equilibrium and boycott equilibria where 
boycott occurs with positive probability. Egorov and Harstad (2017) develop a boy-
cott game between a public regulator, a misbehaved firm and activists. They find that 
in a two-player game without the regulator, ‘private politics’ is beneficial for activ-
ists but harmful for firms. Meanwhile, in a three-player game, ‘private politics’ is 
harmful for activists but beneficial for firms. Our paper contributes to this literature 
by demonstrating that even if when the benefit of free riding is very small, it is suf-
ficient enough to undermine the boycott success probability. We also discuss how 
market size affects a firm’s decision making.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Sect.  2 we discuss the basic 
settings and underlying assumptions in a two-against-one game. The equilibrium 
results are in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we consider a general case where one firm fights 
against a side of many competitors. When the size increases to infinitely large, the 
equilibrium is derived at the limit. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2  Model
Consider three players in a two-sided game of war of attrition competing for the 
winning prize under complete information: two consumers P1 (he) and P2 (she) on 
the demand side and one monopolist P3 (it) on the supply side. Consumers form 
a weak alliance where individual rewards and losses are determined by their joint 
actions. Consumers are identical. They are assumed, unless stated otherwise, to have 
the same incentives and play symmetric strategies. Time is discrete. In each period, 
players move simultaneously. The action set is binary: ai ∈ {F, S}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} 
where F and S represent fight and surrender, respectively. Players have the same 
prior. P3’s action F is driven by lack of corporate social responsibility and therefore 
is viewed as amoral. The complementary action S matches the generally accepted 
social norm and therefore is viewed as moral.
On the demand side, on one hand, driven by moral concern, consumers attempt to 
defeat the firm and force it change its behavior. On the other hand, selfish motivation 
gives rise to a prisoners’ dilemma. Each consumer wishes the other to contribute 
more, that is, to allow him/herself to free ride on the alliance benefit. On the supply 
side, the firm chooses the best response to the joint action of the consumers. It wins 
the conflict only if every consumer is defeated.3 
Table 1  A summary of flow payoffs
v > 2m > 0 , w > c > 0 , w > 𝜖 > 0 eliminate ‘instant surrender’ equilibrium where either side or both 
sides do not bother to fight in the first place. State-n represents the state of the game where n demanders 
remain in the game actively
State-2: one target VS a weak alliance of two competitors
Active fighters
Firm (it) Each consumer (she or he)
 Cost of fighting −m per active consumer − c
 Winning prize v w
 Probability to quit q(2) p(2)
State-1: one target VS one remaining small competitor
Active fighters Early quitter/free rider ( −i)
Firm (it) Remainer (i)
 Cost of fighting −m − c 0
 Winning prize v w 휖
 Probability to quit q(1) p(1) 1
3 One may argue that in reality the monopoly supplier’s decision may depend on the preferences and 
actions of the majority consumers. Thus, it would win (or lose) the game if, for example, half of the 
consumers surrender (or fight persistently). However, the selection of the winning cutoff point would not 
change the main results in this paper.
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The flow payoffs to the players are summarized in Table 1. In each period of a 
two-against-one game, active fighters pay a cost: − c to each consumer and −m per 
consumer to the firm. Only one side can win the game and no tie is allowed. The 
winning prize is w to each consumer and v to the firm. In the case when all three 
players surrender at the same time, each consumer benefits from the firm’s conces-
sion and gets a second winning prize 휖.4 Once one and only one consumer surren-
ders, suppose it is P2, she becomes an early quitter and is not allowed to return to 
the conflict. The game becomes a standard one-against-one war of attrition where 
the remainer P1 has to fight alone against the firm. There is no more fighting cost 
to P2 after her surrender. Moreover, we allow her to get a prize as alliance benefit. 
If the game eventually ends with her ally’s success, she gets the second prize 휖 . If 
instead the firm is the final winner, the early quitter, along with the remaining con-
sumer, gets zero. The common discount factor is 훿 ∈ (0, 1).
The game of war of attrition is as illustrated in Table 2. The game is played only 
once. It stops immediately if either side or both sides surrender at the same time. 
Otherwise, the game continues in State-2 if everyone remains, as Table 2a shows, or 
in State-1 if one of the consumers surrenders, as Table 2b shows.
3  Symmetric equilibrium
We solve the game backwards. We start from State-1 where only one consumer 
remains in the game and fights against the firm alone. For a mixed strategy equilib-
rium to be possible, the indifference conditions to both active players, the remainer 
and the firm, should be satisfied. To the firm P3, in any time t, the utility of fighting 
for one more period U3(F) equals to that of surrendering immediately U3(S).
where the continuation value 훽1 = 0 at equilibrium. Solving the equation, we get
Suppose P2 is the early quitter. The remainer P1 is indifferent between staying in the 
conflict for one more period or quitting now.
U3(F) = U3(S)
⇒ [−m + 훽1훿][1 − p(1)] + vp(1) = 0
(1)p∗(1) =
m
m + v
U1(F) = U1(S)
⇒ [−c + 훼1훿][1 − q(1)] + wq(1) = 휖q(1)
4 The logic of the second winning prize comes from the unevenness of the game. Only consumers bene-
fit from the supplier’s concession in this case but not vice versa. Consider consumers stop boycotting and 
a polluting firm switches to a clean technology at the same time. Consumers get the utility from public 
good (the clean environment) but not from their moral values (concern for social responsibility and joy 
from defeating the firm).
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where the continuation value
at equilibrium. Since the quitting probability q(1) ∈ (0, 1) , we get the unique solution
where B = c − 𝜖 + 𝛿𝜖 + w > 0 . The continuation value 훼1 measures the remainer’s 
desire to stay in the costly conflict. A positive 훼1 shows that the player is willing to 
fight continuously even without support from the alliance.
The early quitter P2 stops paying the fighting cost right after her concession. 
Meanwhile she may get the second winning prize 휖 in each period with probability 
(2)𝛼1 = [1 − p(1)]U1(F) + p(1)U1(S) = 𝜖q(1) > 0
(3)
q∗
(1)
=
c − 훼1훿
c − 훼1훿 + w − 휖
=
B −
√
B2 − 4c훿휖
2훿휖
⇒ U1 = 훼1 =
B −
√
B2 − 4c훿휖
2훿
Table 2  A game of war of attrition among three players
The actions and payoffs of the other player (P2) in parentheses in (a). The payoffs to the early quit-
ter in parentheses in (b). The stopping probabilities to P1, P2 and P3 are p(n), h(n) and q(n), respec-
tively, where n ∈ {1, 2} represents the number of the remaining players on the demand side. P1 and 
P2 are assumed to play the same strategy unless stated otherwise. The mixed strategy equilibrium 
is (p∗
(2)
, p∗
(2)
, q∗
(2)
) in State-2 if P1 and P2 play symmetric strategies. The mixed strategy equilibrium is 
(p∗
(1)
, 1, q∗
(1)
) in State-1 if P2 surrenders and the game continues as a ‘one-against-one’ war of attrition. At 
equilibrium, the continuation values to each active fighting consumer are 훼1, 훼2, 훼3 . In State-1, the con-
tinuation values are 훼1 to the remaining consumer and 훼2 to the early quitter. At equilibrium, the continu-
ation values to P3 are always zero therefore not highlighted separately
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q(1) which is the alliance’s winning probability. The timing of receiving the prize can 
be any t from the period of her surrender to infinity. Therefore, her expected utility is
The expected utility to surrender measures a consumer’s incentive to free ride. A 
positive 훼2 shows that each consumer on the demand side wishes to free ride on the 
benefit of her/his ally’s contribution. Moreover, we find that the following inequality 
always holds given that the firm plays a mixed strategy. 
The intuition of the last inequality is as follows. In the case where a win to the 
demand side does not require every one’s contribution, each consumer hopes to be the 
only early quitter and gets the highest utility Ui(S)|a−i=F , that is, when consumer i sur-
renders and the remaining ally fights alone. If a consumer failed to be the first quitter, 
she/he would stay in the conflict rather than follow the quitter and obtains the lower 
utility Ui(F)|a−i=S . However, the incentive to free ride may lead to an unpleasant result. 
If both players quit at the same time, they get zero utility. There is de facto ‘no ride’. 
Both players may be better off by staying in the conflict longer.
The expected time of obtaining a winning prize ED(1) is the expected length of the 
State-1 game.
Now, we move to State-2 in which two consumers actively fight against the firm. 
Consumers’ strategies are assumed to be stationary as long as the state of the 
game does not change, i.e., before any player concedes. We assume that identical 
(4)
U2 = (0 + 𝜖)q(1) + [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]𝛿(0 + 𝜖)q(1) +⋯
=
𝜖q(1)
1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]𝛿
=∶ 𝛼2 > 0
ED(1) = lim
t→+∞
1
{
1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}
+ 2[1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
{
1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}
+⋯
=
+∞∑
t=1
t
{
[1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}t−1{
1 − [1 − q(1)][1 − p(1)]
}
=
1
p(1)[1 − q(1)] + q(1)
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consumers play symmetric strategies. Analogous to the above, we solve the indiffer-
ence conditions. To the firm P3,
where the continuation values 훽 s = 0 at equilibrium. Since the quitting probability 
p(2) ∈ (0, 1) , we get a unique solution to individual consumer’s quitting probability
To active consumers Pi where i = 1, 2,
where at equilibrium, the continuation value is
We get
Plug 훼 s and p∗
(2)
 , we find a unique solution to q∗
(2)
 . The solution is reported in the 
appendix.
Proposition 1 There is a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (p∗
(2)
, p∗
(2)
, q∗
(2)
) in a 
two-against-one game where two identical players on the demand side are assumed 
to play symmetric strategies.
The following results are derived when we compare the equilibrium strategies 
in two states.
Lemma 3.1 휕p(2)
휕휖
=
휕p(1)
휕휖
= 0 and
휕p(2)
휕w
=
휕p(1)
휕w
= 0
Lemma 3.2 휕p(2)
휕훿
=
휕p(1)
휕훿
= 0
U3(F) = U3(S)
⇒ [−2m + 훽3훿][1 − p(2)]
2 + [−m + 훽1훿][1 − p(2)]p(2)
+[−m + 훽2훿]p(2)[1 − p(2)] + v[p(2)]
2 = 0
(5)p∗
(2)
=
−m +
√
m2 + 2mv
v
Ui(F) = Ui(S)
⇒ [−c + 훼3훿][1 − p(2)][1 − q(2)] + [−c + 훼1훿]p(2)[1 − q(2)] + wq(2)
= [0 + 훼2훿][1 − p(2)][1 − q(2)] + 휖q(2)
(6)
훼3 = [1 − p(2)]Ui(F) + p(2)Ui(S)
= 훼2훿[1 − p(2)][1 − q(2)] + 휖q(2).
(7)q∗(2) =
c − 훿[−훼2 + 훼3 + (훼1 + 훼2 − 훼3)p
∗
(2)
]
c − 훿[−훼2 + 훼3 + (훼1 + 훼2 − 훼3)p
∗
(2)
] + w − 휖
.
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Lemma 3.3 p∗
(2)
> p∗
(1)
 and
q∗
(2)
< q∗
(1)
if 𝛼3 > 𝛼1 + 𝛼2
The first Lemma shows that, to the remaining consumer, the free rider’s winning 
prize would not affect his own strategy at equilibrium. It is in line with our setting: 
players are selfish but not altruistic. Together with the second equation, we know that 
the incentive to free ride (selfishness) dominates regardless how low the potential 
free riding benefit is, which is measured by the second winning prize 휖 , or how strong 
the desire to fight (morality) is, which is measured by the first winning prize w. The 
second Lemma coincides with the standard war of attrition. The discount factor does 
not change active allies’ strategies at equilibrium. However, it matters to the firm’s 
strategies as Eqs. (3) and (7) show. The third Lemma shows that, comparing the equi-
librium strategies in two states, the players on two sides act differently. Consumers, 
driven by the selfish motivations, are more likely to leave the conflict when potential 
support from the alliance exists. Soon we will see that their quitting probabilities 
increase in the size of the demand side n. Meanwhile, the firm surrenders with 
slightly lower probability when facing two players’ challenge if and only if the con-
tinuation values satisfy the condition 𝛼3 > 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 . We can provide numerical solu-
tions to the firm’s quitting probabilities which shows that q(n) may fluctuate with the 
number of consumers n around q∗
(1)
 depending on the values we give. Nevertheless it 
has a clear slow increasing trend. The numerical solutions are available upon request.
4  A generalized case: n‑against‑one game
Now we consider a game where the firm is a large polluting firm that serves many 
consumers in the market. The game of war of attrition between n consumers and one 
firm is as illustrated in Table 3. Note that we change some notations as the follow-
ing. The actions S(Fk) represent the case where player i surrenders and k consumers 
fight. The actions F(Fk−1) represent the joint actions of k active fighting consumers 
where player i is among them. In either case, the game will continue in State-k in the 
next period. We denote the winning prize to the firm to be v(n) indexed by the num-
ber of consumers n. It is, as before, assumed to be large enough to cover one period 
of fighting cost. Thus, it ensures the existence of mixed strategy equilibria—the firm 
would not quit the conflict in the first period. The prize is tempting enough for the 
firm to stay in the costly war of attrition. It is natural to assume that the winning 
prize to the firm increases in n. In a large economy, a big firm that serves many con-
sumers would generate more sales revenue. For simplicity, let v(n) = vn.
As before, we assume that n players on the demand side play symmetric strat-
egy. The quitting probability p(n) is the solution to the firm’s indifference condition
(8)
Uo(F) = Uo(S)
⇔
n∑
k=1
[−km]Ck
n
[1 − p(n)]
k[p(n)]
n−k + v(n)[p(n)]
n = 0
⇔ mnp(n) + v(n)[p(n)]
n = mn
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where Ck
n
=
(
n
k
)
 is a binomial coefficient. k represents the number of active fight-
ers. The continuation values 훽 s = 0 at equilibrium therefore omitted. For any n > 0 , 
m > 0 and v(n) > mn , Eq. (9) has a positive root in the range of (0, 1), a negative root 
and n − 2 imaginary roots if n is an even number. If instead n is odd, the equation 
has a positive root in the range of (0, 1) and n − 1 imaginary roots. The following 
results are derived.
Lemma 4.1 Consumers’ quitting probabilities p(n) increase in the size of the alliance 
n. consumers fight less hard when having potential support from the alliance.
Proof of Lemma 4.1 Rewriting the indifference condition Eq. (9), we define the 
function X(p(n)) = mp(n) + v[p(n)]n − m . By the implicit function theorem
  ◻
(9)⇔ mp(n) + v[p(n)]n = m
𝜕p(n)∕𝜕n = −
𝜕X(⋅)∕𝜕n
𝜕X(⋅)∕𝜕p(n)
= −
[p(n)]
nv ln p(n)
m + n[p(n)]
n−1v
> 0
Table 3  A game of war of attrition between n consumers and one firm
The actions of the other players on the demand side in parentheses. Fk−1 represents the case where among 
the other n − 1 consumers on the demand side, there are k − 1 fighters and n − k quitters. The flow payoff 
to player i and the firm are in the cells. The payoffs to other allies, either active fighters or early quit-
ters, are not shown in the table. The stopping probabilities are (p(n),… , p(n), q(n)) where n represents the 
number of the remaining players on the demand side. Identical consumers are assumed to play the same 
strategy if the state of the game does not change. The mixed strategy equilibrium is (p∗
(n)
,… , p∗
(n)
, q∗
(n)
) in 
State-n. In State-n at equilibrium, the continuation values to player i are 훼ai ,k where ai is player i’s action, 
either fight F or surrender S. k is the number of active fighters excluding player i. There are 2n − 1 con-
tinuation values for player i. At equilibrium, the continuation values to the firm are always zero therefore 
not highlighted separately
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Lemma 4.2 In an n-against-one game where the firm fights against a side of n con-
sumers, when the number of consumers goes to infinity, there is a unique solution to 
consumer’s quitting probability limn→+∞ p∗(n) at equilibrium at the limit. The limit of 
p∗
(n)
 is 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.2 First we prove that there exists a unique real solution p(n) s.t. 
X(p(n)) = 0 for any given m, n, v > 0 . It is clear that X(p(n)) is continuous on the 
interval [0, 1]. X(0)→ −m < 0 when p(n) → 0 and X(1)→ v > 0 when p(n) → 1 . By 
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists at least one p ∈ (0, 1) s.t. X(p) = 0 . 
Suppose there are two solutions p1 and p2 s.t. p1 ≠ p2 and X(p1) = X(p2) = 0 . By 
Rolle’s theorem, it implies that X�(p) = 0 . But X�(p) = m + n[p(n)]n−1v > 0 which is 
a contradiction.
Now we find the limit. We view p(n) as a sequence with 0 < p(n) < 1 satisfying 
Eq. (9):
Divide by p(n) and let y = v∕m,
Suppose that the limit of p(n) is not 1. Since p(n) increases in n, the limit, if there 
exists any, must be close to 1. Denote the limit as p̃ ± 훾 where 훾 is some small num-
ber. We thus have (p̃ ± 훾)n−1 → 0 as n→ ∞ . Plugging this into the LHS gives us 
1 + y[p̃ ± 훾]n−1 → 1 while the RHS goes above 1, which is a contradiction. There-
fore, the limit of an individual consumer’s quitting probability is
Plug it in Eq. (9), we immediately get the following results:
The limits tell us how consumers’ behave in boycott. In the very first period, an 
individual consumer will surrender immediately almost surely driven by free riding 
incentives. However, not all of them will surrender. That is to say, the polluting firm, 
will only face limited boycotting power from the consumers, however, the boycott 
will not end soon, given the infinitely large amount of consumers. Some will act as 
‘loyal supporters of the product’ who would not boycott the firm while the rest will 
act as ‘strict environmentalists’ who boycott for a considerable long period of time. 
The firm thus would expect to suffer some financial loss and damage to corporate 
image from the boycott. However, being patient enough, such loss will reduce over 
time due to the decreasing number of active boycotters.
mp(n) + v[p(n)]
n = m
LHS ∶= 1 + y[p(n)]
n−1 =
1
p(n)
=∶ RHS
(10)limn→+∞ p(n) = 1.
(11)[p(n)]n → 0
(12)[1 − p(n)]n → 0
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To the firm, the quitting probability q(n) is the solution to an individual consum-
er’s indifference condition
where k represents the number of fighters excluding player i. The continuation val-
ues 훼
F,k
 and 훼
S,k
 (indexed by k) are strictly positive and upper bounded at equilibrium. 
There are overall 2n − 1 continuation values in State-n. When there are k active 
fighters remain in the conflict,
represents the continuation value that player i fights with k − 1 remainers and
represents the continuation value that player i surrenders and k players remain in the 
conflict. In particular, when every player on the demand side surrenders, the game 
ends immediately and therefore there is no continuation value.
The following results are derived.
Lemma 4.3 In an n-against-one game where the firm fights against a side of n con-
sumers, when the number of consumers goes to infinity, there is a unique solution to 
(13)
Ui(F) = Ui(S), i ∈ {1, 2,… , n}
⇒ wq(n) + [1 − q(n)]
n−1∑
k=0
(−c + 훼
F,k
훿)[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
= 휖q(n) + [1 − q(n)]
n−1∑
k=1
훼
S,k
훿[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
(14)
훼
F,k−1
= 훼
F,k−1
(
p(k), q(k)
)
= 휖q(k) +
k−1∑
i=1
훼
S,i
훿
[
[1 − p(k)]
iCi
k−1
[p(k)]
k−1−i[1 − q(k)]
]
(15)
훼
S,k
= 훼
S,k
(
p(k), q(k)
)
=
1
1 − [1 − p(k)]
k[1 − q(k)]훿
×
{
휖q(k) +
k−1∑
i=1
훼
S,i
훿
[
[1 − p(k)]
iCi
k
[p(k)]
k−i[1 − q(k)]
]}
(16)훼S,0 ∶= 0
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the firm’s quitting probability limn→+∞ q∗(n) at equilibrium at the limit.
5 The limit of 
q∗
(n)
 is a function of c,w, 휖 and less than 1. That is, the firm tends not to surrender 
and always plays mixed strategies.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 We rewrite the indifference condition (13), for 
q(n) ∈ (0, 1), 훿 ∈ (0, 1),
where the continuation values 훼
F,k
 and 훼
S,k
,∀k are upper bounded and certainly, for 
example, less than w which is the maximum utility an individual consumer can pos-
sibly get. The continuation value 훼
F,n−1
= 훼
F,n−1
(
p(n), q(n)
)
 is a function of p(n) and q(n) . 
Therefore we write it separately. We take the limit on both sides.
(17)
wq(n) + [1 − q(n)]c + [1 − q(n)]
{
n−1∑
k=0
훼
F,k
훿[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
}
= 휖q(n) + [1 − q(n)]
n−1∑
k=0
훼
S,k
훿[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
⇒ 훼
F,n−1
[1 − p(n)]
n−1 +
n−2∑
k=0
훼
F,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
−
n−1∑
k=1
훼
S,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
=
1
[1 − q(n)]훿
{
c[1 − q(n)] − wq(n) + 휖q(n)
}
(18)
lim
n→+∞
LHS = lim
n→+∞
{
훼
F,n−1
[1 − p(n)]
n−1 +
n−2∑
k=0
훼
F,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
−
n−1∑
k=1
훼
S,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
}
= lim
n→+∞
훼
F,n−1
[1 − p(n)]
n−1
+ lim
n→+∞
n−2∑
k=0
훼
F,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
− lim
n→+∞
n−1∑
k=1
훼
S,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
5 The numerical solution for q(n) where n = 1, 2,… , 5 given different 휖 s is available upon request. It 
shows that q(n) fluctuate and increase slowly with n. It implies that the size of the firm has limited impacts 
on firm’s strategy making.
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The first term of Eq. (18) goes to zero at the limit since 훼
F,n−1
 is upper bounded and 
[1 − p(n)]
n−1
→ 0 . Now we show that second term, and by the same argument, the 
last term also approaches zero. Let G(k) = [1 − p(n)]kCkn−1[p(n)]n−1−k . The greatest 
value Ḡ , or called the mode, is given by k = (n − 1 − 1)p(n) = np(n) if k is an integer; 
otherwise, the greatest value is given by largest integer k such that k ≤ np(n).
To find the limit of q(n) , now we try to find an upper bound for p(n) which is lower 
than one. We consider this: ∀j such that n > j > 0,
This must hold.6 7 Then we have
(19)Ḡ = (1 − p(n))np(n)p
−1+n−np(n)
(n)
C
np(n)
n−1
p(n) ≤ p̃ ∶= 1 −
j
n
for large n
pn
(n)
≤ �p ∶=
(
1 −
j
n
)n
→ e−j > 0
6 We find a sequence p̃ such that Eqs. (10) and (11) satisfy. Let ∀n and j such that n > j > 0 ,
∀k > 0, �p = 1 −
j
n
 is monotonically increasing in n.
and
As n→ +∞,
and
p̃ ∶= 1 −
j
n
lim
n→∞
p̃ = 1 −
j
n
= 1
p̃n =
�
1 −
j
n
�n
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
�
1 −
1
n
j
� n
j ⎤⎥⎥⎦
j
= (e−1)j = e−j ∈ (0, 1)
[1 −
(
1 −
j
n
)
]kCk
n−1
[
1 −
j
n
]n−1−k
→
e−jjk
Γ(1 + k)
∈ (0, 1)
∞∑
k=0
e−jjk
Γ(1 + k)
= 1
7 The upper bound p̃ is good enough to find the limit of q(n) . We can proof, for example, that for 
b < 1 , p(n) ≤ p̃1 ∶= 1 − b ln nn  is a even lower upper bound. We can also show that for a small finite n, 
p(n) ≤ p̃2 ∶= 1 −
b
1+bn
 . The proofs are available upon request.
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Plugging p̃ into Eq. (19), we find that for any countable n > 0 and p(n) that satisfies 
Eqs. (10)–(12), when n increases to infinity,
And,
Analogously, the last term of Eq. (17) approaches zero at the limit, which makes the 
left hand side a summation of three zeros.
The limit of the right hand side of Eq. (17) is
Equality (21) is true if and only if limn→+∞[1 − q(n)]훿 → +∞ , that is, 
limn→+∞ q(n) → −∞ which cannot be true. Therefore, Equality (22) gives the unique 
solution for the limit of q(n).
  ◻
Proposition 2 In an n-against-one game where the firm fights against a side of n 
consumers, when the number of consumers goes to infinity, there exists a unique 
(20)Ḡ =
(1 − j∕n)j(j∕n)−j+nnC
n−j
n−1
n − j
→ 0
n−2∑
k=0
𝛼
F,k
[1 − p(n)]
kCk
n−1
[p(n)]
n−1−k
<
n−2∑
k=0
w(1 − p(n))
np(n)p
−1+n−np(n)
(n)
C
np(n)
n−1
= (n − 1)w(1 − p(n))
np(n)p
−1+n−np(n)
(n)
C
np(n)
n−1
< (n − 1)w
(1 − j∕n)j(j∕n)−j+nnC
n−j
n−1
n − j
→ 0
(21)
lim
n→+∞
RHS = lim
n→+∞
LHS
⇔ lim
n→+∞
1
[1 − q(n)]훿
{
c[1 − q(n)] − wq(n) + 휖q(n)
}
= 0
⇔ lim
n→+∞
1
[1 − q(n)]훿
= 0
(22)or limn→+∞ c[1 − q(n)] − wq(n) + 휖q(n) = 0
lim
n→+∞
q(n) =
c
c + w − 휖
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equilibrium (p∗
(n)
,… , p∗
(n)
, q∗
(n)
) in the game where identical players on the demand 
side are assumed to play symmetric strategies.
5  Conclusion
We develop an uneven game of war of attrition between a weak alliance of two con-
sumers and one firm. We examine the extension of free riding incentives and alli-
ance advantage to Maynard  Smith (1974) classic war of attrition under complete 
information. While two sides play a war of attrition, two consumers on one side play 
a prisoner’s dilemma against each other. We allow the free rider to get a prize if the 
game eventually ends with his ally’s success. We derive the Nash equilibrium and 
compare the results to that of a classic one-against-one war of attrition. To the alli-
ance, we find that selfish motivation overcomes moral concern—free riding incen-
tives dominate regardless how strong the willingness to beat the firm is. Consumers 
fight less hard when having more potential support from the alliance. The consum-
er’s probability to surrender increases to one much quicker when compared to the 
firm’s equilibrium strategy.
We then extend the model to a general case where the size of the demand side 
increases. When the market size goes to infinitely large, we find that both sides quit 
the game with higher probabilities at equilibrium. Consumers would surrender imme-
diately almost surely. Meanwhile, the firm’s equilibrium strategies do not change sig-
nificantly regardless of the number of the competitors. Therefore, the game slowly 
becomes a one sided war of attrition where the firm cannot be defeated easily by the 
consumers.
We employ the model to explain consumer boycott where consumers on the demand 
side fight against a misbehaved monopolist on the supply side. Our results suggest 
that in a market where a big firm serves many consumers, the real boycotting power 
is limited by consumers’ free riding incentives. Over time the polluting firm suffers 
less costs due to the decreasing number of active boycotters. That is to say, for a strong 
enough firm that can survive the first several tough periods, the game will slowly favor 
the amoral firm and make it difficult for the consumers to win. Another possible real 
life application of this model can be labor strike where mass employees fight against 
the employer that offers unfair wages. The results therefore suggest the importance 
of third party intervention, either by the government or a non-profit organization. To 
make a boycott or a strike more effective and successful, a well-organized boycott is 
recommended.
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Appendix
The detailed solution to the firm’s quitting probabilities at equilibrium at State-2 in Eq. 
(7) is
where 훼1 and 훼2 are as Eqs. (2) and (4) show. The solution is calculated by 
Mathematica.
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